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Barancik: Shubert Org. v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n 570 N.Y.S. 2d 504 (

case that the availability of a tort remedy under the
FTCA was sufficient to satisfy the plaintiffs due
process rights.16 Although the relief obtainable under the FTCA was damages and not the injunctive
relief sought by plaintiff, this relief was not so
deficient as to constitute a denial of the plaintiff's
due process rights. An alternative remedy can provide less relief.17 The Supreme Court has made
clear that it is the comprehensiveness of the total
statutory scheme and not the completeness of specific remedies that determines whether the plaintiff has a separate remedy such as Bivens.I8 In
dismissing the plaintiffs due process claim for injunctive relief, the court found that Congress offered a comprehensive recovery scheme through
the FTCA, and the plaintiff chose not to use that
remedy.
The plaintiff's claim under the takings clause was
likewise dismissed for failure to state a claim. In
order to proceed with a claim under the takings
clause the plaintiff must prove that the government
took his property under lawful authority. 19 In the
instant case, the plaintiff repeatedly asserted that
the Smithsonian held the paintings unlawfully and
without lawful authority. The court found that the
plaintiffs claims sounded in tort and therefore
were not within the scope of a fifth amendment
taking.

Conclusion
The plaintiff in this case was denied any relief
under his claims of bailment, replevin, due process,
and a fifth amendment taking. Under the bailment
claim, he failed to show the mutual assent of both
Ms. Brooks and the Smithsonian to consider the
exchange a bailment. The replevin claim was
barred because it sounded in tort and the plaintiff
failed to sue under the FTCA within the two year
statute of limitations. Moreover, his failure to utilize the FTCA within the limitation period deprived
him of stating a cause of action under due process.
The takings claim was denied because it sounded
in tort rather than a fifth amendment constitutional violation. 9?

Karen R. Brown
1. French: Sales: Acquisition by Contract, 1990 MARTINDALEHUBBELL LAW DIGEST: CANADIAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST,
UNIFORM AcTs, A.B.A. CODES at FRA-25:

Every creation or transfer of real property interest by
contract must be by notarial act registered upon Register of Real Estate Mortgages. This includes deeds of
sale, deeds of gift, contracts, rights of usufruct or servitudes, long term leases, attachment liens, contracts
creating or dissolving tenancy in common and condominium. (Law of Mar. 23, 1885, Supp. by Decree of Oct.
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30, 1935 and Decree of Jan. 4, 1955). Failure to register
enables acquisition of property by bona fide purchaser
or loss of priority to subsequent transferee who first
registered.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1991).
3. See note 1, supra.
4. See Mac'Avoy v. The Smithsonian Institution, 757 F.

Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1991).
5. Id. at 65.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 67.
8. Id.
9. 29 U.S.C.A. § 41 (West 1991).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1991).
11. See, e.g., Mac'Avoy, 757 F. Supp. at 68.
12. Id.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1991).
14. Mac'Avoy, 757 F. Supp. at 69; see generally Bivensv. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

15. 757F. Supp at 69.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.at 70; accord Schweiker v. Chilichy, 487 U.S. 412
(1988).
19.See Mac'Avoy, 757 F. Supp. at 70.

Shubert Org. v. Landmarks
Preservation Comm'n,
570 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y App. Div. 1991).
Introduction
Petitioners, Broadway theatre owners, brought
suit against the Landmarks Preservation Commission of the City of New York (the "Commission")
challenging the designation of their buildings as
historical landmarks. The petitioners argued that
the landmark preservation statute should be declared null and void because it violated Article 78
of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules and that
application of the statute constituted a taking of
their property in violation of the fifth amendment.'
The court held that the landmark designation was
based upon a thorough investigation and was not
arbitrary or capricious. 2 The court also denied the
constitutional challenge, holding that the application of the Landmarks Law is not a taking of property.3 The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate
Division, affirmed the lower court's decision which
granted the Commission's motion for summary
4
judgment.

Facts
The Commission designated the petitioners' buildings as historical landmarks following several public hearings which the petitioners attended. During
the designation process, the Commission reviewed
material provided by several sources discussing the
historical, cultural, and aesthetic aspects of each
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theatre. As a result of the landmark designations,
no changes could be made to the exterior of the
buildings without the prior approval of the Commission.5 The petitioners brought suit against the
Commission claiming that the designation of their
buildings as landmarks interfered with their ability to adapt the theatres to changing production
needs. The Supreme Court, New York County,
granted the Commission's motion for summary
judgment.6 The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division.

Legal Analysis
The petitioners argued that the Commission's designation of their buildings as historical landmarks
was an attempt to preserve the Broadway theatre
industry as a whole, rather than individual structures. In support of this argument, the petitioners
emphasized that each of the buildings was unique
and that there was no common architectural design
running between the buildings.
In response to the petitioners' argument, the court
addressed the issue of whether the judiciary can
review the decisions made by an administrative
body. Generally, the court may not substitute its
judgment for that of an administrative body where
a hearing was held and there was substantial evidence to support the finding.7 The court noted that
the Commission's decision was based upon an exhaustive investigation consisting of reports and
testimony of experts.
The court recognized that manipulation of the
Landmarks Preservation Law to preserve the
Broadway theatre industry rather than individual
theatres would have been improper." The court
considered the evidence that each hearing addressed the exterior and/or interior of the buildings
in compliance with the Landmarks Preservation
Law. The court held that the designation decisions
were were not arbitrary or capricious. 9
The court then addressed the issue of whether the
Landmarks Law, as applied to the petitioners,
amounted to a "taking" of their property within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. Under the Landmarks Preservation Law, the owner of a designated
building must keep the exterior in good repair and
secure approval of the Commission before exterior
alterations are made. 10 The petitioners argued that
the designation denied them the opportunity to
adapt their buildings to changing productions. This
resulted in an additional cost factor incurred by
both theatre owners and producers.
In response to this argument, the court relied upon
Penn CentralTransportationCo. v. City of New York
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which established that the application of the Landmarks Law does not amount to a taking of property
within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 1 The
petitioners attempted to distinguish Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. City of New York by emphasizing that the case dealt with the issue of restrictions on alterations of historical landmarks rather
than the method of landmark designation. The
court, however, rejected this distinction noting that
the restriction on alterations arises out of landmark designation. The court next considered
whether the Landmarks Law denied the petitioners' "essential use" of their property. A land use
regulation is determined to deprive the owner of
"essential use" of their property when it "renders
the property unsuitable for any reasonable income[,] productive or other private use for which it
is adapted and thus destroys its economic value, or
all but a bare residue of its value."'1 2 The court noted

that there was no prohibition which prevented the
petitioners from receiving an economic benefit from
the use of their theatres for productions. The court
concluded that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the law, as applied to them,
denied them
13
"essential use" of their property.
Additionally, the court noted that the petitioners'
claim that they were deprived of "economic use" of
their property was not ripe for review. 4 This was
because the Commission had not replied to the
petitioners' applications for renovations or alterations of their buildings.

Conclusion
The court upheld the historical designation of the
Broadway theatres, noting that it was based upon
exhaustive research and complied with the Landmarks Law. The constitutional challenge was denied. However, the court mentioned that the issue
of whether the petitioners were deprived of "economic use" of their property was not ripe for review
because the Commission had not responded to the
petitioners' applications for renovations. If the
Commission denies the petitioners' applications for
renovations or alterations, the petitioners must
emphasize their inability to remain competitive in
the theatre industry and that, as a result, they have
been deprived of the "economic use" of their property. 9
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